This paper provides a framework for analyzing the impact of a change in property division law-a natural experiment that a¤ects spouses' bargaining power in a discrete manner-on household decision making. I focus on the 2000 House of Lords decision (White v. White), which led to a more equitable division of assets between divorcing spouses in England and Wales, and estimate its e¤ect on the intrahousehold resource allocation rule using the collective labor supply model. I show that this e¤ect can be expressed as an 'equivalent transfer' of household nonlabor income. The 'equivalent transfer' concept is then used to demonstrate that the unobserved components of the underlying decision process (the individual preferences and the household resource sharing rule) can be identi…ed nonparametrically from changes in observed labor supply. Empirical analysis using the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) for 1991-2006 reveals that married women reduced their labor supply after the law change. I also …nd some evidence that the household resource allocation process changed in their favor.
Introduction
A large body of literature has sought to open the 'black box' of the household and determine how spouses' bargaining power a¤ects household outcomes. Samuelson (1956) was the …rst to challenge the view that a many-person household can be regarded as a single decision unit, and to provide an approach where individual preferences were the building blocks in analyzing household outcomes. Household decision-making models, which take into account individual household members'preferences and emphasize bargaining between spouses, were developed starting in the early 1980s (see, among others, Manser and Brown, 1980; McElroy and Horney, 1981) . The 'collective' approach, developed by Chiappori (1988 Chiappori ( , 1992 , allows individuals to have di¤erent preferences and relies on the assumption that they reach Pareto e¢ cient decisions. Crucial in this construct is the notion of 'distribution factors', de…ned as any exogenous variable that may a¤ect individual decision powers without in ‡uencing preferences nor the budget constraint.
The main challenge of the related empirical literature has been to identify exogenous variations in bargaining power that can be used to estimate its causal e¤ects on economic outcomes (such as labor supply). Prominent examples of distribution factors used by researchers include spouses' individual labor (Browning et al., 1994) or non labor (Schultz, 1990 ; Thomas, 1990 ) incomes, welfare programs bene…ting one of the spouses (Rubalcava and Thomas, 2000) , and marriage market conditions (Angrist, 2002; Chiappori, Fortin, and Lacroix 2002) . In many cases, however, endogeneity may be a serious problem; for instance, whether cross sectional di¤erences in incomes can be considered as exogenous (i.e. uncorrelated with preferences) is unclear. Several authors (including Lundberg, Pollak, and Wales, 1997) have therefore argued that natural experiments, especially those stemming from the unanticipated introduction of a legal or administrative reform, are a particularly interesting source of such variations. For example, a number of studies have focused on the e¤ect on household labor supply of changes in divorce legislation which granted a spouse the right to seek divorce without the consent of the other (Peters, 1986; Gray, 1998; Stevenson, 2007 Stevenson, , 2008 . Lundberg, Pollak, and Wales (1997) analyzed the e¤ects on household consumption choices of an institutional change that transferred child allowance payments from husbands to wives.
However, while natural experiments have provided useful proxies for bargaining power, their potential to shed light on the nature of the household decision-making process itself, in particular to identify intrahousehold allocation processes, has not been fully exploited. One reason for this is that although existing results prove that intrahousehold allocation processes can indeed be identi…ed using distribution factors, the underlying theory (for instance Chiappori, Fortin, and Lacroix, 2002) has only been developed for continuous variables. Most of the time, natural experiments consist in discrete changes; how the corresponding information could be used within the standard framework is an open question.
In this paper, I provide a framework to analyze natural experiments which a¤ect household decision-making in a discrete manner. I introduce the key notion of 'equivalent transfer', de…ned as the amount of nonlabor income needed by a household such that the wife receive the same share of resources in the old regime as she would receive under the new regime. I then show that, generically, equivalent transfers are nonparametrically identi…able from labor supply behavior. In turn, the identi…cation of equivalent transfers allows to recover individual preferences and the intrahousehold allocation of resources. Since the method introduced here can be applied to any natural experiments that a¤ect households in a discontinuous way, it is a useful tool in analyzing a variety of policy changes in a structural model of household decision-making.
As an illustration, I consider a landmark decision by the House of Lords in 2000 (White v. White) that paved the way towards a more equitable division of assets between divorcing spouses in England and Wales. This legislative change unexpectedly entitled the …nancially disadvantaged spouse, usually the wife, to a higher share of total assets in case of a divorce. Therefore, it redistributed bargaining power within the household. As a preliminary step, I establish that the law change a¤ected married women's labor supply. A di¤erence-in-di¤erences analysis of reducedform labor supply functions (using Scotland as a control group) reveals that married women in England and Wales reduced their labor supply after the law change by around 2-3 hours per week.
This …nding naturally leads to the question of how the law change a¤ected the intrahousehold resource allocation process and the spouses' individual welfare. In a second stage, I estimate a collective labor supply model using data from the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS). The results indicate that the sharing rule was a¤ected by the law change, and that its redistributive e¤ect depends on the spouses'earning potential.
Recent empirical studies have used variables describing the marriage market as proxies for spouses'relative bargaining position. For example, Angrist (2002) showed that exogenous shocks to the sex ratio attributable to immigration episodes which increase the scarcity of women tend to reduce female labor force participation. Chiappori, Fortin, and Lacroix (2002) used crosssectional variation in sex ratios and in divorce legislation across U.S. states to show that when sex ratios and legislation are more favorable to women, wives'labor supply is lower while husbands' is higher. While my paper uses the same approach to modeling labor supply as Chiappori, Fortin, and Lacroix (2002), a key di¤erence is that I exploit an exogenous change in divorce legislationarising from the 2000 House of Lords decision in England and Wales -to investigate the e¤ects on household bargaining and economic outcomes.
The paper also relates to studies which analyze the response of labor supply to divorce law changes. These have mostly focused on the "unilateral revolution" in the U.S. Peters (1986) estimated the e¤ect of the shift from mutual consent to unilateral divorce on labor force participation across U.S. states and found that married women increased their participation in the labor market in response to the law change. Gray (1998) and Stevenson (2008) allowed the response to the introduction of unilateral divorce to depend on the property division laws in place, and arrived at con ‡icting conclusions. Unlike Gray (1998), Stevenson (2008) found that unilateral divorce led to an increase in female labor force participation regardless of the underlying property division laws.
While determining which spouse bene…ts from the introduction of unilateral divorce law is not straightforward as it depends on which spouse values divorce more, this is possible in the context of a shift to a more equitable division of assets at divorce because it leads to a larger share of assets being assigned to the …nancially disadvantaged spouse. Here I show that property division laws a¤ect labor supply decisions, and the introduction of more equitable division of assets leads wives to reduce their labor supply.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces the law change, sets out the theoretical framework, and presents reduced-form estimation results. Section 3 proves the identi…ability of the decision process and presents structural estimates of the collective labor supply model. Section 4 concludes. Major changes in divorce laws have occurred in the U.S. and Europe since the late 1960s, some that have made it easier to obtain divorce, and others that have made the division of property between divorcing spouses increasingly equitable. Divorce has been made easier through the transition from mutual consent to unilateral divorce laws, while the division of assets at divorce has witnessed a gradual move from separation of spouses' individual assets to more equitable distribution of assets between spouses.
In England and Wales, under English Common Law, the principle of separate ownership of assets was upheld. 1 Section 25 of the Matrimonial Causes Act (1973) laid the ground for reallocation of assets between divorcing spouses and set out factors that judges should consider while doing this. Courts exercised discretion in this respect and divided assets taking into account future needs, reasonable requirements and the contribution they made to the accumalation of family wealth (Cretney and Masson, 1997 ). This needs-based approach mostly meant that the wealthy spouses, usually husbands, kept most of their assets and the less a-uent partners, usually wives, received a small share of assets (Tee, 2001; Smith, 2003) . However, at the turn of the century, the House of Lords adopted the yardstick of equal division, which had an e¤ect of dividing the pool of assets mostly equally (Tee, 2001 ), through their decision in the White v. White case (October 26, 2000) . In Scotland, which was not a¤ected by this change, the division of assets accumulated during marriage (acquests) has explicitly been 50:50 since the Family Act Law was inacted in 1985.
Martin White and Pamela White married in 1961 in England and built during their 33-year marriage two successful farming businesses. The marriage broke down in 1994, when the wife petitioned for divorce and sought the sum of £ 2.2 million out of total assets valued at £ 4.6m. 1 The separation of property between spouses dates from the Married Women's Property Act (1882) (see Tee, 2001 ).
The money was to enable her to …nance her own farming business after the divorce. On the basis of needs assessment and reasonable requirements, the judge awarded her £ 800,000 and left the farms and business to the husband. Mrs. White appealed, arguing that her contribution to the partnership had been insu¢ ciently valued by the court. The Court of Appeal considered the case, and decided to award her £ 1.5 million to better re ‡ect her contribution to the business and to the family. The House of Lords (the highest court in the country) ruling upheld the decision of the Court of Appeal.
Starting with the White v. White landmark case, the House of Lords held that the starting point for equitable distribution in all divorce cases must be 50:50 (equal division), and that trial judges must stop looking at need …rst of all as the highest priority (Crouch, 2000). It was upheld that "..a judge would always be well advised to check his tentative views against the yardstick of equality of division. As a general guide, equality should be departed from only if, and to the extent that, there is good reason for doing so." (House of Lords 2000 Decision on White v. White). In the words of matrimonial lawyers at legal practice Charles Russell LLP, "A check against equality must be carried out in all cases to ensure fairness, non-discrimination and good reasons for departing from equality should be given by the Court." The decision is viewed by the legal profession as "the most important decision in ancillary relief work for a number of decades" (Charles Russell LLP) 2 , and "... a remarkable sea-change in judicial policy" (Herring, 2001 ).
Given the practice that all assets that belong to spouses, including the ones acquired before the marriage, are included in the pool to be divided, the law change is likely to result in considerably more transfers to the …nancially disadvantaged party compared to the previous practice.
Anecdotal evidence suggests that the law change had an important impact on the share of divorces favoring women, demand for prenuptial agreements (which have no legal standing in British courts), and the propensity to conceal assets by divorcing spouses. Surveys of family lawyers organized by family law practice Grant Thornton LLP reveal that both the shares of divorces with a 50:50 split or a 60:40 split (favoring women) of family wealth, have recently been on the rise. 3 Although the decision was not a strict equal division rule and judges can, and do, exercise discretion it is now the norm rather than the exception for family wealth to be divided equally between husband and wife, regardless of who earned what during the marriage.
Divorce cases following White have witnessed greater awards to applicants than before. Although prenuptial agreements have no legal standing in British courts, larger demand for them is also reported by the vast majority of the family lawyers interviewed by Grant Thornton (see also Rainer, 2007) , although celebrity prenups (such as the one agreed by actors Catherine Zeta Jones and Michael Douglas) or lack thereof in high-pro…le divorce cases (such as that of Heather Mills and Paul McCartney) may partially explain the trend. Finally, again according to the Grant Thornton LLP surveys, the propensity to conceal assets while divorcing appears to be on the increase. In 2007, in 88 percent of the cases it is the husband and only 2 percent of the cases it is the wife who tried to hide assets; in the remaining 10 percent both spouses tried to do so.
Theoretical framework
Consider a household comprising two individuals with utility functions
where h i is individual i's labor supply, C i is a private Hicksian composite good, and x is a vector of demographic variables that a¤ect individual preferences (e.g., the education level). Let y stand for the amount of nonlabor income available to the household members. The household members should decide how much labor to supply and how to allocate the total income among themselves. I follow the collective modeling approach proposed by Chiappori (1988 Chiappori ( , 1992 , and without employing any particular decision-making process, I assume that the …nal outcomes are Pareto e¢ cient. That is, they are determined through the following program: Note that the Pareto weight, , determines the …nal outcome on the Pareto frontier. The assumptions on will be crucial for the analysis that follows. 4 Any factor that a¤ects the choice on the frontier, in principle, can be allowed to enter the Pareto weight. In bargaining theory, parties' outside options are crucial determinants of the …nal allocation and any variable that a¤ects parties' respective outside options enter (P 1) through . To incorporate the property division regime into the household decision-making process, I allow the regime, along with other variables that potentially a¤ect the outside options, to change the Pareto weights of spouses.
Then, the weight can be written as (w 1 ; w 2 ; y; x; R) where R = 0; 1 stands for the two regimes.
Rewriting (P 1): 4 The case where weights are constant corrresponds to the unitary model.
The rationale behind this choice is as follows: if the two regimes re ‡ect di¤erent divisions of total assets between the wife and the husband, then the switch from one regime to the other improves one spouse's outside option relative to the other's by exogenously putting more assets under her control in case of divorce. This leads to a higher Pareto weight for the spouse whose outside option improves. Note that R enters (P 10) only through the Pareto weights, that is, I
assume that it does not a¤ect neither individual preferences nor the household budget set: in the collective model terminology, it is a distribution factor. This assumption will allow me to analyze the e¤ect of the property division regime on household decision-making using only spouses'labor supply.
Examples of distribution factors include the sex ratio (Angrist, 2000; Chiappori, Fortin and Lacroix, 2002), divorce legislation (Rangel, 2006) , and welfare programs (Rubalcava and Thomas, 2000) . McElroy (1990) coined the term "Extra Environmental Parameters" for variables that a¤ect the spouses' outside options in a Nash-bargaining framework, and investigated their implications for household demand. The crucial feature of the distribution factor here, namely the property division regime, is that it a¤ects the spouses'Pareto weights in a discontinuous way.
What are the implications of a change in the property division regime for household behavior?
Speci…cally, how does labor supply respond to a change in R and what can be inferred about household bargaining from that response? An alternative characterization of (P 1 0 ) provided by Chiappori (1992) , which uses the individual income shares instead of the Pareto weights, will be key in answering these questions.
Proposition 1 (Chiappori 1992): Assume U 1 and U 2 are strictly quasi-concave, increasing, and continuously di¤ erentiable then (P1') is equivalent to the existence of some function (w 1 ; w 2 ; y; x; R) such that individuals 1 and 2 solve their individual programs:
Intuitively, the proposition states that the household problem (P 10) can be summarized using the function : once the spouses receive their respective shares of nonlabor income, and y , each one solves her own optimization problem. The function is called the "sharing rule"; it re ‡ects the allocation of nonlabor income between spouses as determined by the household decision-making process. Note that there is a one-to-one correspondence between the Pareto weight and the sharing rule and since the property division law R enters (P 10) only through , it enters (P 2) only through . Therefore, the law change a¤ects the household outcomes only through its e¤ect on this resource allocation mechanism. If the law change improves, say, the wife's position, then her weight in the decision-making process, , increases; this translates into a higher share of nonlabor income being allocated to her. To the extent that spouses'labor supply is responsive to income, the income e¤ect will lead to a reduction in wife's labor supply and an increase in the husband's labor supply. In the next subsection, I provide empirical evidence for this e¤ect.
A change in the property division regime, R, potentially a¤ects the way in which nonlabor income is shared between the spouses and leads to changes in labor supply. However, the function (w 1 ; w 2 ; y; x; R) is not observable to the econometrician, thus cannot be directly estimated. The main purpose of this paper is to analyze the e¤ect of the law change on the household decision-making mechanism as summarized by this resource allocation rule. Chiappori, Fortin, and Lacroix (2002), to which this paper is most closely related, analyzed the case with continuous distribution factors, and showed that the sharing rule can be identi…ed from observed labor supply up to a constant. In contrast, the discrete change created by the law change considered here requires a new approach. In Section 3, I show that this discrete change can be alternatively expressed as a transfer of household nonlabor income which can be estimated from observed labor supply. This transfer enables the identi…cation of the sharing rule hence enables a welfare analysis of the e¤ect of the change in law. For this analysis I estimate a collective labor supply model in Section 3.
Reduced-form Estimation
In the di¤erence-in-di¤erences approach is the distribution of unobservable individual characteristics.
Unbiased estimation using cross-sections requires that the unobservable individual characteristics come from the same population distribution before and after the law change. The panel analysis enables me to address this concern.
The evolution of average labor hours supplied by married women in England & Wales relative
to Scotland is depicted in Figure 1 . The graph shows that subsequent to the law change, the average number of labor hours supplied by married women remained below the pre-existing trend in England & Wales, while no such pattern is observed in Scotland. The evidence is suggestive of the impact the move to a more equitable division of assets upon divorce had on the labor supply of married women in England & Wales relative to Scotland.
On the pooled cross-sections, I estimate a weekly paid labor hours regression using two estimators: Tobit and OLS. The dependent variable y it is the (observed) number of weekly labor hours; in the Tobit, the latent dependent variable is given by y it where y it = max f0; y it g, and it
is assumed that the errors are normally distributed (u it j x it~N (0; 2 i )):
where the variable LAW is a dummy, set equal to one in England & Wales starting in 2000/01, and zero prior to the law change in England & Wales and in Scotland throughout the period. 5 The coe¢ cient is interpreted as the average change in female labor hours attributable to the law change, and is expected to be negative. The vector of control variables contains age, age squared, the number of children (0 4 and 5 15 years of age), a dummy for urban residence, nonlabor income, a full set of educational dummies; and husband-level controls such as age, age squared, and educational dummies. In addition, all regressions include the country-wide level of female unemployment to control for potentially di¤erent business cycles. Linear country-speci…c time trends are also included to investigate the robustness of the results to accounting for di¤erent pre-existing trends in labor supply across the two groups. The standard errors are clustered at the individual level, and all regressions use cross-sectional BHPS sampling weights 6 .
On the panel sample, I estimate the same regression using the Tobit estimator with …xed e¤ects (FE), and OLS-FE. The speci…cation is given by:
where i represents the individual speci…c …xed e¤ect. Table A2 reports the baseline results, with two estimators for each sample (Tobit and OLS for the pooled cross-sections, and Tobit/FE and OLS/FE for the panel).
The law change appears to have led to a reduction in weekly labor supply of married women by around 2 hours. All coe¢ cients are statistically signi…cant at conventional levels and are robust to accounting for country-speci…c pre-existing trends. The higher coe¢ cients obtained in the panel suggest that concerns regarding the distribution of unobservable characteristics in the pooled cross-sections may be valid.
I also estimated male labor supply functions, using the same speci…cation, and found no evidence of a response to the law change (Table A3 ). The absence of an e¤ect is not surprising given the well-known inelastic behavior of males'labor supply (see Pencavel, 1986 for a survey). 7 Although the results presented above consistently show a reduction in married women's labor hours after the law change, it is possible that policy changes or shocks which have not been accounted for in the baseline speci…cations, may have driven weekly labor hours over the period covered in the analysis. In that case, the labor supply response of married women documented here cannot be attributed to the change in the property division law. To investigate this possibility, I
undertake a similar analysis for single women. Although an e¤ect of the same law change may alter the labor supply of single women due to anticipation e¤ects, note that the law change does not act as an exogenous shock on their future marriage. For future marriages, it is the new property division law that is relevant. Thus, the change cannot lead to an unexpected redistribution of power. The di¤erence-in-di¤erences results for the sample of single women are shown in Table   A4 . Using the same baseline speci…cations (and eliminating husband-related controls), I …nd no signi…cant e¤ect of the law change on single women's labor supply. This suggests that confounding events are unlikely to be the cause for the observed change in married women's labor supply.
The e¤ect on the married women's labor supply is broadly in line with the intuition that the law change on average acts as a transfer of power to wives since they are generally the …nancially disadvantaged spouse and hence stand to bene…t from the new property division regime in case of a divorce. In the next section, I investigate the e¤ects of the change on the household decisionmaking within the collective model framework. for i = 1; 2, and interior solutions for labor hours. Furthermore, assume that h i s are continuously di¤erentiable. Then, the individual problems in (P 2) imply that
and h 2 (w 1 ; w 2 ; y; x; R) = H 2 (w 2 ; y (w 1 ; w 2 ; y; x; R); x)
where H i s represent the Marshallian labor supply functions. The goal is to show, using the change in labor supply created by R, that it is possible to characterize the resource allocation process as being summarized by the sharing rule. Speci…cally, using the spouses'observed labor supply, the partial derivatives of the sharing rule can be recovered under both regimes.
Recasting The E¤ect of the Law Change
Since the sharing rule is not observed, individual 1 ' s labor supply H 1 cannot be directly estimated, but it takes a special form: her spouse's wage w 2 enters only through , or as a determinant of the share she receives through the household decision-making process. The same is true for y therefore using the observed labor supply h 1 , it is possible to estimate the ratio of w 2 to y . The divorce law, R, also enters the labor supply only through . However, since it is not a continuous variable, a switch in R leads to a discrete change in . This change in 1's share, (w 1 ; w 2 ; y; x; 1) (w 1 ; w 2 ; y; x; 0), is not observable. My strategy will be to replicate the e¤ect of a switch in R on through a change in a continuous variable, namely, nonlabor income. 
This calculation is similar to the "equivalent variation" in essence: the switch from regime 0 to regime 1 leads to a change in individual 1's share ; is the amount of nonlabor income that is necessary for spouse 1 to receive the same share that she would under the new regime, while remaining at the initial regime, 0. I will call this level of nonlabor income, "equivalent transfer."
A movement to this new, hypothetical, level of household nonlabor income leads the wife to receive the same share as under a law change. It thus replicates the e¤ect of the law change on the household resource allocation process.
Neither side of equation (5) is observed. However, the following lemma shows that such a can be expressed in terms of observed variables, and that its partial derivatives can be recovered using observed labor supply.
Lemma 1 Assume is monotonic and unbounded in y, then there exists a function (w 1 ; w 2 ; y; x)
such that (5) is satis…ed and 
in an open neighborhood containing (w 1 ; w 2 ; y; x).
Proof. Note that (w 1 ; w 2 ; y; x; 1) = (w 1 ; w 2 ; ; x; 0) implies
which in turn implies
The proof uses this identity and the Implicit Function Theorem to obtain (w 1 ; w 2 ; y; x). See Appendix B for details.
Here, the su¢ cient condition on is rather innocuous, as it simply states that as the household nonlabor income increases, individual 1 receives a higher share of this bigger pie. As will be shown (3) and (4) they form a system of partial di¤erential equations. In Appendix B it is shown that this system can be, generically, solved and that the partials of the sharing rule under both regimes can be recovered using the partials of observed labor supply functions h i s. ii) The following conditions are necessary for h 1 and h 2 to be solutions of (P2) for a sharing rule at R = 0; 1
where h i (1) = h i (w 1 ; w 2 ; y; x; 1) and h i (0) = h i (w 1 ; w 2 ; ; x; 0) for i = 1; 2.
iii) Finally, once the sharing rule is identi…ed, the partial derivatives of the Marshallian labor supply functions H 1 and H 2 can be recovered using equations (3) and (4).
Proof. See Appendix B.
Note that all the restrictions in ii) involve only the derivatives of the observed labor supply functions with respect to nonlabor income and wages, hence are easily testable. It is important to check that they hold in order to ensure that the labor supply functions are compatible with the collective model. These conditions are identical in nature to those derived in Chiappori, Fortin and Lacroix (2002): (7-1), (7-2) and (7-3) are the cross derivative restrictions on the sharing rule, while (8-1) to are the generalizations of the nonnegativity of own-price substitution e¤ects to the collective setting.
The Change in the Level of The Sharing Rule
The procedure outlined in Proposition 2 yields two sets of partials for the sharing rule , one for each regime. This allows an analysis of the interaction of divorce law with the resource allocation process as a function of wages and nonlabor income. A natural next step is to determine the change in the level of attributable to the change in divorce law. Proposition 2 states that the sharing rule (w 1 ; w 2 ; y; x; R) is identi…ed up to two constants k(x; 0) and k(x; 1) for any given
x. In fact, one of these constants is redundant. Formally: 
Since the right hand side of (10) is observed, once (w 1 ; w 2 ; y; x; 0) is normalized to a level, one can uniquely solve for T if H 1 is decreasing in unearned income. Chiappori (1992) showed that the sharing rule is identi…ed in a similar three-commodity model without a distribution factor, but this result uses second derivatives of labor supply functions.
The existence of continous distribution factors as in Chiappori, Fortin, and Lacroix (2002) provides additional information about the sharing rule in the form of di¤erential equations involving them. As a result, only the …rst derivatives of the labor supply functions are required for the identi…cation, this eases the data requirements in empirical applications. In the above model the discrete change provides additional information about the sharing rule and identi…cation requires the …rst derivatives of labor supply functions, which again is bene…tial in empirical applications.
As argued earlier, natural experiments provide better proxies for changes in bargaining power than cross-sectional variations. The method described above provides a way of analyzing the e¤ects of such exogeneous changes on household decision-making.
good is assumed to be private. This assumption provides the crucial exclusion restriction and leads to the labor supply functions in (3) and (4) . The existence of a public consumption good will mean that generally, equations (3) and (4) will not be valid. In the presence of public goods identi…cation of the decision process will require additional assumptions. Blundell, Chiappori, and Meghir (2005) analyze this case and show that identi…cation requires either a strong assumption of seperability of leisure and private consumption good from the public good, or the existence of a continuous distribution factor.
The analysis so far has focused on household resource allocation and labor supply and ignored another household outcome that is likely to be a¤ected by the law change: fertility and child rearing. In the existence of children, expenditures on whom are presumably public goods for the spouses, the seperability of leisure and private consumption good from the public good is likely to be too restrictive. A more complete analysis of the e¤ect of the law change requires allowing for public goods and domestic production in the form of child rearing. Research is underway to incorporate public goods into the above setting and (in the absence of seperability), exploit the information provided by the discrete distribution factor to extend the identi…cation result.
Estimation of Household Labor Supply
In this subsection, I estimate jointly the female and male labor supply functions, h 1 and h 2 , to recover the sharing rules, the equivalent transfer, and to test the restrictions of the model. Previously, I assumed interior solutions for both spouses'labor supply; the result was exploiting the continuous variation in hours due to wages. As a consequence, for purposes of the estimation I restrict the sample to couples in which both spouses work. Donni (2003) analyzed a similar model with continuous hours, allowed for nonparticipation, and showed -under some regularity assumptions -that the identi…cation of the sharing rule can be extended to cases where one of the spouses does not participate in the labor force. 8 
A Functional Form
Estimating and testing the model developed above requires estimation of derivatives of two labor supply equations with endogenous regressors. For this task, I use a parametric approach. The functional form of labor supply is the semilog system given below in (11-1) and (11-2), which di¤ers from that of Chiappori, Fortin, and Lacroix (2002) In the two equations above, no restrictions are imposed on the way in which the law change a¤ects the observed labor supply functions. In the theoretical framework, it was assumed that the law change did not alter preferences. This implies that any change in the labor supply functions (12-1) and (12-2) must originate from changes in the sharing rule caused by the legislative regime shift. I estimate the above unrestricted model and then check the validity of this assumption.
The Sharing Rule and The Equivalent Transfer
Applying the sharing rule derived for this functional form by Chiappori, Fortin and Lacroix 
The equivalent transfer associated with this functional form of labor supply is given by (w 1 ; w 2 ; y; x) = a log w 1 + b log w 2 + c log w
where
, c = Finally, the Marshallian labor supply functions compatible with (11-1) and (11-2) and the sharing rule above are of the form
for the wife and husband, respectively, where 
Data and Estimation Results
The dataset consists of the cross-sections from BHPS waves 1991/92 to 2005/06 and the sample comprises only the households in which both spouses participate in the labor force. The sample is further restricted to households in which the wife has between 18 and 55 years of age and the husband between 18 and 60 years of age. Since the self-employed individuals' wage is not wellde…ned, couples with a self-employed spouse are dropped. Finally, to preserve the two-decision maker nature of the household, I eliminate those household in which adults (that is, individuals older than 18 years of age) other than the spouses are present. The dependent variable, both in wife and husband regressions, is the number of usual weekly paid labor hours (including overtime).
Wages are de…ned as the average hourly labor income, while nonlabor income, y, is the monthly unearned income and includes income from investments, transfers, bene…ts, and pension.
Demographic controls, previously denoted as x in (12-1) and (12-1), include indicator variables for race and region of residence, age and education for both spouses, and the number of children in the household. While some demographic variables may a¤ect preferences and the sharing rule simultaneously, I make no identifying assumptions on them, and concentrate solely on the consequences of the divorce law change for the sharing rule.
Wages and nonlabor income are treated as endogenous, since unobservable characteristics that are correlated with both variables may also be correlated with the disutility of work, which is part of the error term of the labor supply regression. I construct instruments based on the idea of using population groups whose wages have been changing di¤erentially over time (Blundell, Duncan and Meghir, 1998). The instruments are interactions of age and education variables with time dummies for both spouses, as follows:
for i = 1; 2 where D t is the time dummy.
This choice requires that the e¤ect of cohort and education on the endogeneous variables, changes di¤erentially over time. Note that time dummies and both spouses' education levels are included in (12-1) and (12-2), which means that the speci…cation allows for di¤erences in labor supply behavior between these groups. The validity of the instruments also requires that the di¤erences in the labor supply behavior be constant over time, after controlling for wages, house, terraced house, ‡at, etc.), which re ‡ects long-term decisions and is likely to be exogenous to current labor supply decisions, is also used.
The estimation method used is Three-Stage Least Squares.
The results from the labor supply equations (12-1) and (12-2) are summarized in Table A5 . It is notable that the parameters of the husband's labor supply function are imprecisely estimated, which can be partially explained by the fact that the dependent variable, male weekly labor hours, does not exhibit much variation.
Before discussing the sharing rule and the equivalent transfer, I check the validity of the assumption that the preference parameters do not change between the two regimes. The parame-ters are reported in in the collective labor supply literature. The husband's wage elasticity is negative and small and imprecisely estimated. These elasticities are obtained using the Marshallian labor labor supply functions (14-1) and (14-2), and individual shares, and y , are held constant by assumption.
The cross-derivative restrictions on the sharing rule, equations (7-1) to , and the nonneg- under both regimes, which implies that the condition must be checked. I …nd that it is satis…ed under both regimes.
The sharing rules in the old and new regimes, representing the wife's share, are presented in Table A7 . To determine if the coe¢ cients of the sharing rule changed between the two regimes, I test for the equality of wage coe¢ cients, log w 1 , log w 2 and log w 1 log w 2 , respectively. The tests yield the p-values of 0:090, 0:084, and 0:092. In contrast, the test for the nonlabor income coe¢ cient yields a p-value of 0:660, therefore one cannot reject at the conventional levels that the nonlabor income coe¢ cients were the same under the two regimes. While some caution is warranted, these results suggest that the e¤ect of the law change on the sharing rule depends on the wages of the two spouses.
To see how these coe¢ cients translate into marginal e¤ects, I report in Table A7 To the extent that wages are good proxies for individual wealth, it can be concluded that the wealthier party loses under the new regime and must make a higher transfer to the other party.
The direction of change in coe¢ cients underpinning this result is the same for both spouses, but it is of higher magnitude for the husband.
Finally, a £ 1 increase in household nonlabor income leads to a £ 0.68 increase in wife's nonlabor income under the initial regime and a £ 0.96 increase under the new regime. This means that as household nonlabor income increases a higher share of it is transfered to the wife, although this change is statistically insigni…cant. Overall, there is some evidence that the sharing rule, as a function of wages and nonlabor income, has been a¤ected by the law change. Notably, this e¤ect depends on the spouses'wages.
The equivalent transfer estimates in the lower panel of Table A7 reveal a similar pattern. The coe¢ cients are quite precisely estimated, however the partial derivatives at the sample mean are much less so. Recall that the equivalent transfer represents the nonlabor income needed by a household so that in the old regime the wife receives the same share of resources she would receive in the new regime. The marginal e¤ects, at the sample mean, reveal that as the wife's wage increases by £ 1, the transfer necessary to replicate the e¤ect on her share decreases by £ 5.22 (in monthly nonlabor income terms). Conversely, as the husband's wage increases by £ 1, the transfer increases by £ 2.50. This is in line with the …ndings for the sharing rule; as the wife earns higher wages, the transfer to her due to the law change will be lower, as re ‡ected by the lower equivalent transfer necessary at the houshold level. In this case, she bene…ts less from the law change. As the husband enjoys higher wages, the transfer to the wife will be higher as re ‡ected by the higher equivalent transfer necessary. In this case, the wife stand to bene…t more from the new property division regime.
Conclusions
This paper contributes to a large body of literature that analyzes the interaction between bargaining power and household outcomes. Natural experiments which a¤ect spouses'decision power can help better understand the nature of the household decision-making process. Here, I extend the collective model to incorporate discrete changes in the household decision-making mechanism document that the law change reduced married women's labor supply by around 2-3 hours per week, which suggests that some redistribution of resources occurred within the household. Second, I estimate a collective labor supply model, and …nd some evidence that the wage coe¢ cients of the sharing rule changed in the new regime. This shows that the redistributive e¤ect of the law change depends on the spouses' relative earning potential. In the new regime, the sharing rule became more responsive to spouses' wages: an increase in one spouse's wage leads to a higher income transfer to the other spouse than before. This e¤ect is stronger for husbands.
Several studies have brought attention to public policies which in ‡uence the household decisionmaking process. Examples of policy changes similar to that studied here, include extending alimony rights to cohabiting couples (Rangel, 2006) Finally, for the partials of with respect to w 2 under the two regimes:
Appendix A REDUCED-FORM RESULTS

COLLECTIVE LABOR SUPPLY ESTIMATION RESULTS
De…ne C(w 1 ; w 2 ; y; x; R) = def @h 1 (w 1 ;w 2 ;y;x;R) dw 2 @h 1 (w 1 ;w 2 ;y;x;R) dy
Note that C(w 1 ; w 2 ; y; x; R) = w 2 (w 1 ; w 2 ; y; x; R) y (w 1 ; w 2 ; y; x; R)
Since y (w 1 ; w 2 ; y; x; R) is identi…ed at (w 1 ; w 2 ; y; x; 1) and (w 1 ; w 2 ; y; ; 0) from above, using
